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In 
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GLADYS WILSTED, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
HUGH NATION, 
Defendant and Appellant 
Appeal From the District Court of Salt Lake 
County, Utah. 
Honorable P. C. Evans, Judge 
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In 
The Supreme Gourt 
of the 
State of Utah 
GLADYS WILSTED, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
HUGH NATIO·N, 
Defendant and Appellant 
Appeal From the District Court of Salt Lake 
County, Utah. 
Honorable P. C. Evans, Judge 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT 
This is an action at law in which the respondent 
sued for damages for breach of promise of mar-
riage. The appellant in his answer admitted that 
at the time of the alleged promise he an.d the re-
spondent were unmarried persons. He also ad-
mitted that he had married another woman, a.s al-
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leged in the complaint. He then denied generally 
all the other allegations of the comp~laint and set 
up no special defense whatever. The action was 
tried to a jury and the jury returned a verdict in 
favor of the re·spondent. 
The appellant assigns as error that there is no 
substantial evidence to support the verdict and also 
that the court erred in denying his. motions for a 
non-suit, directed verdict and new trial. 
Before discussing the merits of appellant's 
contention, V\re \vill refer to some of the matters 
mentioned in appellant's brief. Most of his brief 
is made up of irrelevant observations, having no 
bearing on the is.sue now before this Court, relating 
not only to matters occurring at. the trial and 
appearing in the record, but also as to matters 
which do not appear in the record and which exist 
only in the imagination or fancy of the appellant or 
his counsel. Statements of ·fact are so intermingled 
with flippant remarks and observations which are 
not true or which a.re so exaggerated that one be-
comes be,vildered as to the object of the ap~pellant 
and his counsel. It is impossible to tell whether 
in presenting the case in this manner the appellant 
is attempting to show that there is no substantial 
,evidence to support the verdict, or simply to villify 
and slander the respondent, or to amuse the court, 
or is just trying to be funny. In any event much 
of the matter set forth is simp·ly scurrilous and 
untrue, and the manner in which it is s.tated is en-
tirely improper, if not unethical, in making a pre-
sentation of the case to this Court for review. 
The ap~pellant dwells at some length on the 
fact that these parties were married and after-
wards divorced. As to this, the· divorce became 
final and both of them were unmarried persons and 
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competent to enter into nn engagement of marriage 
and contract of marriage 'vhen the promise was 
made. The appellant does not deny this, but states 
that the divorce \\~as procured by collusion and cites 
authorities to the effect that a decree of divorce 
thus obtained is void, It app·ears from statements 
in appellant's brief that he and his counsel, Mr. 
1\Iatthe\v·s "\Yere the principal actors in inducing the 
respondent to olitain a divorce and a.re re~sponsible 
for any collusion, if there was collusion, and in 
view of this fact, this criticism comes with very 
poor grace from them. In effect they are condemn-
jng themselves. Bnt all this has nothing to do with 
this case as now presented to this Court. It is im-
l1ossible to understand \Yhat object the appellant 
and his counsel have in making this contention, un-
less it is to ask this Court to declare the divorce 
null and void; in which event the appellant, Iiaving 
in the meantime married another woman, would be 
a bigamist and guilty of a crime. 
There is also contained in this brief a long dis-
sertation on the attitude of app~ellant 's family 
toward respondent and their objections to her 
marriage to appellant. The respondent is called 
a menial and, by other sla.nderojus phrases1 and~ 
innuendoes, the appellant and his counsel seek to 
blacken her character and impute to her improper, 
mercenary and vicious motives. All this s.eems to 
us to he highly reprehensible and unethical and can 
in no \Yay aid the Court in determinjng the ques-
tion of law involved. 
The appellant and his eounsel have also at-
tempted to make a great deal of the fact that dur-
ing the marriage of these parties they had sexual 
intercourse, and with scandalous remarks and in-
nuendoes have tried to make- out that these parties 
continued theBe relations after the divorce and o·e-
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fore the promise to remarry. This is not true. This 
whole insulting tirade is based on the testimony of 
the respondent, (A b. 25), as follows.: 
'' Q. Now during the time you were mar-
ried to him did you have intercourse with 
him! 
A. Yes. 
Q. And afterwards f 
A. Yes.. 
Q. After this last engagement~ 
A. Yes.. 
Q. After he res.umed his. relations ·and 
was that because of this p-romise that he 
was going to marry you . again f 
A. It was." 
A fair and reasonable construction of this is, that 
while she had intercourse with him during her mar-
riage to him, · there was no resumption of these 
relations until after they were again engaged to he 
married and that it was hecaus.e of thl.s p~romise 
to marry her that she consented. This period was 
from April 15, 1939 to July 23, 1939, when he mar-
ried another woman. 
As we conceive the case the only questions. in-
volved are: Is there substantial evidence in the 
·record to support the verdict and did the court err 
in denying appellant's motions for a non-suit, 
directed verdict and new trial. 
It· will be observed that there is no contention 
on the p1art of appellant that the court erred in the 
admission of evidence nor in instructing the jury. 
No requests for ins.tructions were submitted by the 
appellant and no exceptions to the instructions 
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given by the court 'vere taken by him or his 
counsel. 
Therefore, we will briefly call the court's. at-
tention to the evidence, 'vhich we contend is amply 
sufficient to support the verdict. It is conceded 
that on April 15, 1939, each of these parties was 
unmarried and each was competent to enter into 
a contract to marry each other and to marry. It 
is also conceded tha.t on July 2'3, 1939, the ~appel­
lant married another woman, so that if there was· 
a promise to marry the respondent, this marriage 
constituted a breach. 
THE RESPONDENT CONTENDS THAT THE 
MUTUAL PRO~MISE TO MARRY BE-
TWEEN HER AND THE APPE1I-lL.A .. NT ~ 
AS ALLE~ED IN HER COMBLAINT, IS 
PR0\1ED, NOT ONLY BY A p,R\EPOND,ER-
ANCE OF THE EVIDENCE, BUT BEYO·ND 
ALL REASONABLE· DOUBT. 
The respondent testified, (A b. 16) : 
''About Ap,ril 15, 1939, we were both un-
married. He (the appellant) said he loved 
me and '\vanted me to marry him. . . . 
I promised I would marry him, but no 
date was set.'' 
This was a proposal and an acceptance and 
a mutual p,romis.e to marry. The fact that no date 
was set, makes no differenee. The law on (that 
question is briefly set. forth in 
11 Corpus Juris Secundus, p. 776, Sec. 9, _ 
as follows: 
"While the promise may of course be to 
n1arry at a fixed time, it is not necessary 
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specific time for performance be a,g~I"eed on 
as the law will imply, where no time is 
fixed by the ·parties, that the contract is 
to plerform within a reasonable time; and 
a. promise to marry within a reasonable 
time is sufficiently definite as to time of 
performance to support an action for its 
breach.'' Cases cited. 
The :appellant in his answer denied that there 
was a promise. In giving his testimony, however, 
he admitted that there was a promise by him to 
marry the respondent, hut at first said it was con-· 
ditioned upon the removal of the objections of hiR 
family, and then afterwards admitted that it was 
not so conditioned, but was an absolute promise·, 
substantially as stated by respondent. His testi ·_ 
mony on this point is as follows: 
(Ab. 28) "There was a promise of mar-
riage if the objections, could be overcome. 
(Ab. 29) Q. Did you state that you were 
not going to let any objections they had 
stand in your way~ 
A. If I could have overstepped them. 
Q. And then you said you were g'Oing to 
marry her (respondent) anyhow didn't 
you~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And when I asked you if the~ objec-
tions of your children had been removed, 
you said you were not going to let those 
things stand in the way of your happiness, 
didn't you~ 
A. Yes.'' 
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The appellant here admits the promise·. and 
\Vhile at first he says it was conditional, he after-
ward5 says that not\vithstanding the objections 
which his children had to his marriage he was go-
ing to marry the respondent. 
On the question of \vhether the promis.e wa.s con-
ditional, the respondent testified, (~~b. 25): 
"As I understood ~Ir. Nation's p~roposal, 
the objections of his family were not to 
stand in the vva y at all. 
Q. That is, you understood that he was. 
not going to let the family stand in the 
way~ 
A. Yes.'' 
.· . . We \Yere going to be married any-
'vay regardless of ".,.hether his family still 
objected or not.'' 
This is also corroborated by the testimony of 
the appellant relating to his efforts to have the 
divorce set aside. (A b. 29). This. is also corrob-
orated by the letters of the appellant to r~spondent. 
All these letters contain words of endearment and 
affe:ction and no one can read them and not be 
convinced beyond all doubt that the appellant 
,promised to marry the respondent, without ·any 
condition, and that he intended to carry out the 
. promise. 
The promise of marriage was in- express 
words, a.s shovvn by this testimony and other evi-
d<~nce, but even if it we-re not so, it would not 
change the matter. A p1romise to marry need not 
be in express or formal words. All that is neces-
~ary is that the mjnds of the parties have met and 
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that there is a mutual understanding between them 
that they are to be married to each other. 
4 R . C . L . , P·· 145. 
THE RESPO,NDENT ALSO CONTEND·S THAT 
APPELLANT'S MOTIO·NS FOR A NON-
SUIT, DIRECTED VERDICT AND NEW 
TRIAL, WERE PlRO·P'ERLY DIE·NIED BY 
THE COURT. 
The motions for a non-suit and for a directed 
verdict were both based on the insufficiency of the 
evidence to justify submission of the cas~e to tlie 
jury. It seems to us that from what we have al-
ready said on that ques.tion, it is unnecessary to go 
into the matter further. There certainly was suf-
ficient evidence, as shown by the record, to which 
'we have referred, to justify the court in submit-
ting the case to the jury. 
As to the motion fior a new trial, while all 
grounds were stated in the notice of intention, the 
only ground relied on or pre·sented was that of 
newly discovered evidence. This was based on the 
affidavits of Della May Nielsen and Edith Willis, 
found at pages 29 and HO respectively, of the Tran-
scrip,t. The most casual glance at these affida;vifs 
will convince the Court that there was absolutely 
:nothing stated in either of them that could in any 
'vay be considered as a ground for a new trial. 
Even counsel for the appellant seems. to be of the 
same opinion as. he does not mention this matter 
in his brief. 
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THE RESPO·NDENT CONTENDS THAT AS 
THIS IS AN ACTION AT LAW THE MAT-
TERS OF THE WEIGHT OF THE EVI-
DENCE AND THE CREDIBILITY OF THE 
·WITNESSES ARE NOT BEFORE THE 
COURT; .6-t\.ND THAT IF THERE IS SUB-
STANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD 
TO SUPPO·RT THE VERDICT, THERE 
BEING KO ERiRORS AT LAW PRESENT-
ED, THE JUD·GMENT S H 0 U L D BE 
AFFIRMED. 
There are many decisions of this Court on 
this subject. This Court has. uniformly held that 
in actions at law if there is substantial evidence to 
support the judgment it will not interfere. This 
rule is so well established that citations seem un-
nec.essary. 
There is ample evidence) as shown by the rec-
ord, to sustain the verdict and judgment in this 
case and there are no errors of law mentioned or 
presented. Therefore we submit that the judgment 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully, 
DUNCAN & DUNC-4.\N, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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